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INTRODUCTION
With the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.,1 the general mood among those in the human
rights community is pessimistic.2 Because it curtails use of the Alien
†

Interim Dean and Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. See Editorial, A Giant Setback for Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A26
(―The Supreme Court‘s conservatives dealt a major blow Wednesday to the ability of
American federal courts to hold violators of international human rights accountable.‖);
David G. Savage, Justices Rule U.S. Courts Not World Forum for Human Rights Suits, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2013, at 21 (―In a decision welcomed by corporate leaders and decried by
human rights activists, the justices said U.S. courts are limited mostly to deciding disputes
over conduct that took place on American territory, not on foreign soil.‖); see, e.g., Kiobel
Ruling Undermines U.S. Leadership on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-ruling-undermines-u-s-leadership-onhuman-rights (―Today in its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Supreme
Court gutted the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a law that has been on the books for more than
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Tort Statute (ATS),3 viewing Kiobel as a loss in an ongoing
ideological struggle is tempting. From this perspective, Kiobel is
another indication that the Court continues to reinvent itself with a
particular brand of conservative activism,4 the United States remains
deeply hostile to international law and its institutions,5 and corporate
interests have yet again won out over the protection of individuals.6
For some, the Court‘s finding that the Alien Tort Statute does not
redress claims of human rights violations by foreigners against
foreigners on foreign soil can be scratched up as a win on the side of
those pushing for tort reform, for those who believe there is too much
litigation in the United States,7 and for those who courts, as unelected institutions, need to be carefully watched and constrained.8
The first reaction of many academics concerned with protecting

200 years and for the last 30 years has been a critical avenue to hold serious human rights
violators accountable.‖); Kiobel v. Shell: Light Dims on Human Rights Claim in the U.S.,
CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/section.php?id=510 (last visited May 13,
2013) (―[T]he Supreme Court significantly limited human rights litigation as we know it.‖).
3. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2006). The Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789 as part of the
first Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.
4. See Geoffrey R. Stone, When is Judicial Activism Appropriate?, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13,
2012, at 19 (―[W]e have now entered a troubling era of conservative constitutional
jurisprudence [that] is best characterized as ‗conservative activism.‘‖).
5. For a recent discussion in the popular press, see John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed,
Obama‟s Weakness on Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at A35 (noting ―Republican
opposition to international agreements, which certainly has risen among the party‘s senators
in recent years,‖ and that the Obama Administration has secured Senate approval of the
fewest number of treaties in any four-year presidential term since World War II).
6. See Geoffrey Pariza, Student Article, Genocide, Inc.: Corporate Immunity to
Violations of International Law After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L
L. REV. 229, 253 (2011) (―If allowed to stand, Kiobel will have a tremendous impact on the
future of ATS litigation concerning corporate defendants. . . . The decision has already had a
negative impact on ATS plaintiffs complaining of human rights violations, child labor, and
environmental contamination . . . .‖).
7. See, e.g., Claude Wyle, Congress Judiciary Committee Chair Seeks to Reduce
Accountability for Corporations, LEGAL EXAMINER S.F. (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:53 PM),
http://sanfrancisco.legalexaminer.com/miscellaneous/congress-judiciary-committee-chairseeks-to-reduce-accountability-for-corporations-.aspx?googleid=307520 (―Bob Goodlatte,
the Judiciary Chairman of the United States House of Representatives, released an
inflammatory statement . . . blaming litigation costs for America‘s bad economy and poor
global competitiveness.‖).
8. See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Anton Fagan, Determining
the Stakes: Binding and Non-Binding Bills of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 73,
84 (Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001) (describing an academic‘s opinion
of judges as ―a group of unelected individuals‖ whose ability to change private law is
potentially ―anti-democratic‖ and ―must be subjected to constitutional constraint‖).
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human rights will be to decry the result and paint the case as a
setback.9
But, in many ways, this particular narrative misconstrues what‘s
at stake. While the Kiobel decision may reflect the U.S. Supreme
Court‘s turn to the right, international and human rights lawyers
should find some solace in the decision. Viewed through a different
lens, Kiobel is a case about whether the United States should
privilege unilateralism over multilateralism, and whether it prefers
international over pluralistic approaches to global governance. In this
way, those concerned about the advancement of human rights should
spend little time (and for academics, little ink) decrying the Kiobel
result. Instead, the case may signal the beginning of a modest, and
welcome, retreat from a failed strategy of aggressive American

9. The commentary on the international law blog, Opinio Juris, on the day the Court
released its Kiobel decision provides an example. See, e.g., Roger Alford, The Death of the
ATS and the Rise of Trasnational Tort Litigation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:48 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-transnationa
l-tort-litigation/ (―The ATS as we know it is dead . . . But after Kiobel, human rights lawyers
have precious few alternatives.‖); Anthony J. Colangelo, An Extraterritorial Cause of
Action, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobelinsta-symposium-an-extraterritorial-cause-of-action/ (―[T]he Court‘s extension of the
presumption against extraterritoriality to causes of action is both conceptually mistaken and
doctrinally unsupported under longstanding principles of the law of nations.‖); Thomas H.
Lee, When Can the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Be Rebutted?, OPINIO JURIS
(Apr. 17, 2013, 3:29 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-insta-symposium-whencan-the-pre sumption-against-extraterritoriality-be-rebutted/ (―Based on my quick read
through the opinions, it seems that it‘s a win for corporations and a loss for international
human rights groups . . . .‖); Peter Spiro, Human Rights Will Survive Kiobel, OPINIO JURIS,
(Apr. 17, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/human-rights-will-survivekiobel/ (―This is a tough loss for the human rights advocacy community, ending an era . . .
.‖); Julian Ku, SCOTUS Votes 9-0 That Corporations Cannot Be Sued Under ATS for
Extraterritorial Acts Without U.S. Interest at Stake, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 11:52
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/scotus-votes-9-0-that-corporations-cannot-be-suedunder-ats-for-extraterritorial-acts-without-u-s-interest-at-stake/ (―Bottom line: Corporate
general counsels! Rest easy, your long, transnational ATS nightmare is over!‖). The
commentary on SCOTUSBlog shortly thereafter provides another example. See, e.g., Oona
Hathaway, The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 19,
2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remainsopen-to-foreign-squared-cases/ (concluding that ―foreign cubed cases‖ are now ―off the
table‖); Donald Childress, An ATS Answer With Many Questions (and the Possibility of a
Brave New World of Transnational Litigation), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:03 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-an-ats-answer-with-manyquestions-and-the-possibi lity-of-a-brave-new-world-of-transnational-litigation/ (arguing that
plaintiffs‘ ability to file ATS claims in federal court is now substantially limited and
predicting ―a brave new world of transnational litigation‖ under state and foreign law).
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unilateralism—viewed by other countries as legal imperialism10—
that has taken root in a number of public and private law contexts.
The case could mark an opportunity to renew efforts to return to more
vigorous international lawmaking based on multilateral consensus. In
this way, to the extent Kiobel is a step to interring unilateral
regulation of foreigners for conduct occurring abroad, the case is not
a setback for international law or human rights, but rather a
vindication of them.
This Article recasts Kiobel as one case in a line of cases
involving unilateral, extraterritorial regulation. It unfolds in three
parts. Part I begins by describing the rise of extraterritoriality and
how extraterritoriality, in both the public and private law contexts,
became a uniquely American way to build empire. Innovations in
legal theory from both the right and left of the political spectrum
aided and spurred the prevalence of extraterritorial laws. As rightleaning academics attacked international law and its institutions, leftleaning academics began to exalt sub-state mechanisms and
transnational networks, as a way to operationalize pluralistic as well
as liberal theories of international law and relations. Those pressures
from both sides of the academic spectrum created an intellectual
environment where unilateral use of domestic law became perceived
by many academics and policymakers as a more preferable way to
address global challenges and as a substitute for more robust
international lawmaking.
After describing extraterritoriality‘s rise, the Article sketches its
decline. Part II describes how extraterritorial approaches eventually
came under sustained attack. Those attacks, however, rarely reflected
debates about international law and global governance. Rather the
attacks replicated domestic political and culture war debates—
squabbles over tort reform, over separation of powers and federalism,
and over the role of courts. Finally, Part III explains why Kiobel has a
brighter side for those committed to advancing human rights.
Kiobel‘s curtailing of extraterritorial regulation of foreigners may be
a setback for those promoting pluralistic and certain kinds of liberal
10. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA.
J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 1, 28–29 (1987) (describing how an exorbitant jurisdictional assertion
―can readily arouse foreign resentment‖ and ―provoke diplomatic protests, trigger
commercial or judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields‖); John
Byron Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Laws, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1698 (1985) (explaining that using the effects test
to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction was perceived as ―Yankee ‗jurisdictional jingoism‘‖ that
spurred ―wide-spread resentment‖).
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international relations theories, but it should not be a setback for
human rights.
Understanding the focus and limits of this critique is important.
The perspective advanced is supportive of efforts to aggressively
prevent atrocities, like those present in Kiobel, from re-occurring.
Respect for human dignity is a key component of an effective and
legitimate global governance regime. It‘s a perspective that embraces
national courts as appropriate places to use and enforce international
law, and that those courts can play a critical role in promoting
international human rights. Concerns about extraterritoriality do not
arise if we hold our own citizens and corporations liable for human
rights abuses, whether occurring in the United States or abroad. It
rejects, however, the notion that meaningful, sustainable change can
occur through unilateral regulation of foreign conduct, divorced from
international agreement even when addressing so-called universal
norms. The costs of extraterritorial regulation, whereby each nation
defines their own version of international norms and then applies
them to foreigners for conduct occurring abroad—whether in public
law cases like Kiobel, or in the private, commercial law context—are
significant. Most problematically, unilateral, extraterritorial
regulation can undermine other longer-lasting, multilateral efforts to
advance respect for human rights.
I.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Extraterritoriality has been defined in varying ways. Generally
though, extraterritorial laws are understood to refer to national
laws—enacted unilaterally and untethered from international
agreement—that regulate conduct abroad.11 Extraterritoriality can
also be understood in terms of jurisdiction, when a legislative body

11. Cf. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.3 (1992) (―A case ―involves
extraterritoriality when at least one relevant event occurs in another nation.‖); Jeffrey A.
Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 123 (2011) (―A law is extraterritorial if it governs acts
that occur outside the nation-state‘s borders, even if committed by the nation‘s own
citizens.‖); Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV.
1019, 1024–25 (2011) (explaining how the concerns over extraterritoriality ―drop out for
statutes implementing international law‖ but ―persist for statutes enacted under legislative
sources authorizing the enactment of purely national law‖).
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uses a basis of prescriptive jurisdiction other than a territorial one.12
While extraterritorial jurisdiction has innocuous forms (for example,
jurisdiction over one‘s own nationals or jurisdiction to punish
offenses directed at state security), it becomes contentious when one
state purports to tell foreigners what they can or cannot do on foreign
soil.13
Despite
its
contentiousness,
unilaterally-imposed
extraterritorial laws have recently become prominent fixtures in
global governance.14
A.

Early Beginnings

Until recently, extraterritorial laws were exceptional in the
international system; if they were not prohibited, they were at least
strongly disfavored.15 Long-established public international law
principles of territorial integrity, sovereign equality, nonintervention,
and self-determination16 meant that power ended at the border.17 A
12. For an overview on the different bases of jurisdiction, see Harvard Research in
International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT‘L L. 435, 445 (Supp.
1935) (describing five bases of jurisdiction, including territorial, protective, nationality,
universal, and passive personality); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) (describing bases of jurisdiction); I.A. SHEARER,
STARKE‘S INTERNATIONAL LAW 183–212 (11th ed. 1994) (describing bases of jurisdiction
under international law).
13. See Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228
(2011) (―[T]here are serious legal, diplomatic, and moral tensions inherent in the
extraterritorial application of law.‖); INT‘L BAR ASS‘N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 11 (2009), available at http://www.ibanet.org (―The
starting point for jurisdiction is that all states have competence over events occurring and
persons . . . present in their territory. This principle, known as the ‗principle of territoriality,‘
is the most common and least controversial basis for jurisdiction.‖). For a detailed
description of similar problems regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Austen L. Parrish,
The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality‟s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008).
14. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 815, 820 (2009) (describing the ―rise of extraterritorial domestic law (law
unilaterally applied to the conduct of foreigners abroad)‖).
15. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1228 (―The exceptionalism of
extraterritoriality reflects the foundational ideals of the international state system.‖).
16. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (setting out a citizen‘s right to participate in government);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948) (setting out the right to self-government); U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (noting
UN‘s basic respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination). See generally
Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26
SAIS REV. 11, 11 (2006) (―Since the end of World War II, the international political system
has been structured around three central tenets: the notion of equal sovereignty of states,
internal competence for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing
boundaries.‖).
17. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing that ―matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state‖ are excluded from UN jurisdiction); Corfu Channel
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state‘s domestic laws, with rare exceptions, only applied to peoples
within the state‘s borders.18 The reason for the limitation was largely
pragmatic: it sought to reduce conflict between nations and ensure
international peace and stability.19 But there was also a moral
imperative against extraterritorial regulation. Each nation, it was
believed, should have the right to choose its own path, without
interference from others.20 The international system did not foreclose
domestic courts from being involved in global governance, nor did
the system presume regulatory free-zones. But cross-border
regulation was primarily the purview of international law and
international institutions, not domestic law. To the extent domestic
law and courts were used to decide foreign, extraterritorial disputes, it
was through international agreement.21
(U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (rejecting a state‘s claim of a right of intervention to
secure evidence from the territory of another state, noting that ―[b]etween independent
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note (1987) (recognizing an international norm against a state
exercising power in another state‘s sovereign territory).
18. See S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (―[T]he
first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in
the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial . . . .‖); id. at 56
(dissenting opinion of Lord Finlay) (―A country is no more entitled to assume jurisdiction
over foreigners than it would be to annex a bit of territory which happened to be very
convenient for it.‖).
19. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (describing how each state has territorial integrity and
political independence and prohibiting the use of force or threat of the use of force).
20. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (providing that ―[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination‖);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (same). For a recent discussion, see Dinah Shelton, Self-Determination in
Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 60 (2011)
(arguing that the right of self-determination is universal in scope, while noting no right to
secession).
21. The famous Trail Smelter arbitration is a good example of this. The 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty was drafted precisely because at the time there existed ―no remedies or
redress‖ for transboundary harms. Robert Day Scott, The Canadian-American Boundary
Waters Treaty: Why Article II?, 36 CAN. B. REV. 511, 518 n.15 (1958) (quoting the Draft
Press Release, prepared for Secretary Knox, in Chandler P. Anderson Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress) (―[T]he treaty proceeds to establish a new rule for the benefit
and protection of those interests, on either side of the boundary . . . there being, under
existing conditions no remedies or redress in such cases.‖); Stephen C. McCaffrey,
Transboundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in Private Litigation
Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 191, 196 (1973) (discussing
reasons for the drafting of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty). See generally
TRANSBOUNDARY HARMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER
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Among other restrictions,22 two complimentary procedural
doctrines worked together to render extraterritorial regulation
extraordinary. One was prescriptive jurisdiction,23 which limited
states from enacting laws that regulated foreign conduct.24 The other
was adjudicatory jurisdiction, which prevented courts from asserting
power over foreign defendants outside a state‘s borders with which
the state had no contact.25 As Justice Story famously declared, ―every
nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its
own territory,‖ and ―it would be wholly incompatible with equality
and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of any nation, that other nations
should be at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its

ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006). For an overview and a
discussion of recent, similar litigation, see Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà vu:
Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to
Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005).
22. The local action rule was most prominent among these restrictions. See Joel A.
Gallob, Birth of the North American Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff:
Transboundary Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access and Remedy, 15
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 96 (1991) (describing the local action rule as providing that ―an
action in tort for damage to real property must be brought where the property is located‖);
H. Scott Fairley, Private Remedies for Transboundary Injury in Canada and the United
States: Constraints Upon Having to Sue Where You Can Collect, 10 OTTAWA L. REV. 253,
264–67 (1978) (describing how U.S. courts approached the local action rule to prevent
transboundary disputes); see also British S. Afr. Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique [1893]
A.C. 602 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). Forum non conveniens was another procedural
doctrine that continues to inhibit certain forms of transnational litigation. For a recent
discussion, see Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011).
23. For an early treatment, see Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1587, 1608 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (―[T]he
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.‖); The Appollon, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (―The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own
territories, except so far as regards its own citizens.‖); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (―The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute.‖).
25. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (setting out what was believed to be
universal and undisputed principles of international law that ―no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory‖); see also D‘Arcy v.
Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850) (noting how jurisdictional limits were derived
from international legal principles based on territorial limits on power). See generally KEVIN
M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5 (1999)
(describing how territorial jurisdiction ―arose among a band of independent sovereigns,
limited in what they could do, but more importantly limiting themselves in what they would
do in order to avoid stepping on the others‘ toes‖); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional
Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 796–808 (1955) (explaining how the
American colonies inherited a long-standing tradition from international law that recognized
territorial borders as the key limitation on a sovereign‘s authority and jurisdiction).
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own territories.‖26 Justice Holmes similarly explained the ―general
and almost universal‖ rule: ―the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done.‖27 This basic understanding was unassailable.28
The United States, for much of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, strongly promoted these foundational tenets to the
international system. In the nineteenth century, when the United
States was not yet a World Power, the prohibition on extraterritorial
regulation was particularly aligned with U.S. interests.29
Extraterritorial laws were synonymous with empire-building and the
unseemly bullying of smaller nations by great powers.30
Extraterritoriality also closely resembled—and was a variation on—
the ―taxation without representation‖ that the early colonists
decried.31 Put simply, the United States didn‘t want European powers
meddling in its internal affairs. This was true in the human rights
context too after World War II, where human rights were enforced on
a state-to-state level and strong territorial states were seen as essential
to securing respect for those rights.32 Rather than ignoring the

26. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (1834).
27. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356; see also 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 311–12 (1935) (―Since the power of a state is supreme within its own
territory, no other state can exercise power there . . . . It follows generally that no statute has
force to affect any person, thing, or act, outside the territory of the state that passed it.‖).
28. Cf. 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1906) (―There is
no principle better settled than that the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial
force‖); Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 12, at 480–84 (describing the
settled tenets of territorial jurisdiction).
29. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 57 (2009) (―As a weak nation, with an
uncertain relationship to the great powers of the day, the early United States was
unsurprisingly drawn to the principle of complete sovereign control within demarcated
geographic borders.‖); BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE
OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (recounting the application of U.S. constitutional provisions to
new U.S. territories acquired after the Spanish-American War).
30. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 29, at 57.
31. See, e.g., DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY 21–23 (1998) (describing the leading slogan of the American Revolution, ―No
Taxation without Representation‖); see also Grant Dorfman, The Founders‟ Legal Case:
“No Taxation Without Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV.
1377, 1377–80 (2008) (describing the history behind the phrase ―No Taxation without
Representation‖).
32. For a detailed description of this history post-World War II, see Austen L. Parrish,
Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1108–11 (2011)
(describing the territorial underpinnings of human rights).
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territorial limits of international law, leaders in the human rights
movement sought to harness the power of the territorial state to
protect against genocide and other atrocities that had occurred with
Nazi Germany.
This is not to say that law was always strictly territorially
confined; exceptions existed.33 And even aside from these exceptions,
there were times when territorial limits were honored in the breach,
particularly when the United States was dealing with so-called ―lesscivilized‖ nations.34 But the exceptions were narrow and limited, and
more often than not viewed as highly contentious, if not illegal. 35 The
antitrust area provides one example, where the United States
tendentiously reinterpreted the ―objective territoriality‖ principle36 to
justify its regulation of foreign conduct.37 The rest of the world,
however, viewed the projection of U.S. commercial law abroad as
American exceptionalism in its worst form.38 In the context of ―lesscivilized‖ nations, the disparate treatment was, in hindsight, a source

33. See Sarah Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification
Under the European Convention, 20 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 1223, 1223 (2009) (―[E]xisting
categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction can best be understood as limited exceptions to the
rule of territorial jurisdiction . . . .‖). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 401–403 (1987).
34. See DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 140–
75 (2011) (describing U.S. extraterritorial activity on the southern border); Daniel S.
Margolies, The “Ill-Defined Fiction” of Extraterritoriality and Sovereign Exception in Late
Nineteenth Century U.S. Foreign Relations, 40 SW. L. REV. 575 (2011) (describing the use of
extraterritoriality by the United States in the late nineteenth century). Territorial integrity
was also not respected when dealing with indigenous tribes. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–26 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that ―[t]o see indigenous
peoples as ‗states‘ would in the end prove all too difficult for Western eyes‖).
35. See ANAYA, supra note 34 (explaining how an exception allowed Westerners to
disavow indigenous people from statehood).
36. S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30 (Sept. 7) (describing
the objective territoriality principle as situations where a crime‘s effects were so much a part
of the act that produced them and the effect was a constituent element of the crime). For a
discussion of the objective territoriality principle, see Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative
Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673, 1680–81 (2012).
37. See generally Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust
Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1999).
38. Cf. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1270–71 (―[A]pplying U.S. antitrust
law overseas poses potential conflicts with other countries‘ laws and can prompt
international political disputes. Similarly, when other countries exercise jurisdiction in a
manner that affects American interests, policymakers and affected parties in the United
States face challenges in either confronting or complying with foreign antitrust principles.‖
(footnote omitted)).
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of embarrassment.39 Extraterritorial regulation thus sat in the shadow
of the law: something to be tolerated on occasion, but rarely
embraced.
B.

Extraterritoriality‟s Rise

Academics studying the Alien Tort Statute are familiar with its
commonly told history. For many years, the statute lay dormant. In
1980, however, with the landmark Filártiga v. Peña-Irala case,40 the
Second Circuit catapulted the statute to the forefront as a tool to
remedy human rights abuses.41 Through cases such as Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic,42 Kadic v. Karadžić,43 Doe v. Unocal Corp.,44
and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,45 among others, domestic human rights
litigation evolved.46
This doctrinal story while not inaccurate is far from complete.
Changes in application of the Alien Tort Statute represent just one
example of much broader transformations that were occurring.47
Beginning in the 1980s and then in full force in the 1990s,
extraterritoriality began to take on a new significance in a wide range
of contexts. While commercial laws, like antitrust and securities, had
been long applied abroad, non-commercial laws had been more
39. A good example exists with indigenous peoples. See generally ANAYA, supra
note 34, at 26–28 (explaining how territorial sovereignty was initially associated only with
the ―civilized‖ European nations).
40. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. See generally Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT‘L L. 1, 6–10 (2002) (describing the case and its implications); Beth Stephens, Upsetting
Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration‟s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation,
17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004).
42. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
43. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
44. 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
45. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
46. See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends
and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 456, 460
(2011) (describing the number of cases filed annually and trends in Alien Tort Statute
litigation).
47. See generally Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty – U.S. Litigation in the Mirror
of International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2002) (describing the globalization of U.S.
civil justice). For a recent discussion, see Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute,
Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 715 (2012)
(―In looking at ATS cases, therefore, one confronts many of the questions related to
transnational litigation in U.S. courts.‖).
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constrained.48 The 1990s saw this change (some would say
dramatically) as extraterritoriality became widespread in all areas of
U.S. law.49
The trend was not limited to the United States, however. In
response to American unwillingness to limit the reach of its laws,
other countries began to embrace unilateral extraterritorial regulation
too.50 Some even hoped that greater unilateral regulation would
paradoxically spur eventual international regulation and
harmonization.51 National courts began to play a more prominent role
in global governance.52 The development of universal jurisdiction
and the increase of Alien Tort Statute cases were representative of
this trend.
48. See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990) (describing how
market and non-market cases were treated differently by courts).
49. For a general discussion of extraterritoriality in U.S. law, see GARY B. BORN & PETER
B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011);
VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS (2d ed. 2008); see also Rep. of the Int‘l Law Comm‘n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9,
July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, Annex E, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
516 (2006); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 app. at 181–84 (2011)
(listing U.S. laws that apply extraterritorially); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22497, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 94–166 (2012)
(listing U.S. federal criminal statutes that have an extraterritorial application).
50. See Parrish, supra note 14, at 846–48 (listing contexts in which U.S. laws have been
applied extraterritorially and situations where foreign nations have begun to use their laws
extraterritorially too). Several have described the exportation of American-style litigation.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing the exportation of U.S. law); see also Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation
Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT‘L L. 165 (2009) (describing the spread of U.S. style litigation).
For a discussion in the human rights context, see Anne Bloom, Taking on Goliath, Why
Personal Injury Litigation May Represent the Future of Transnational Cause Lawyering, in
CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
2001).
51. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 101, 169 (1998) (describing how
the United States and Europe have both adopted a unilateral approach to antitrust law with
positive outcomes in regulation and harmonization).
52. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic
Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 59 (2009)
(describing how national courts are beginning to more aggressively engage with and
interpret international law); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44
HARV. INT‘L L.J. 191, 217–18 (2003) (describing a world of transnational judicial interaction
and relations); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 67, 96–115 (2009) (analyzing the global impact of domestic courts); Tonya L.
Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the
Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT‘L ORG. 459 (2009) (describing the changing role of national
courts in transnational regulation).
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In some ways, the rise of extraterritoriality was a matter of
convenience. Extraterritorial laws were politically more expedient
than traditional international law making, as treaties increasingly
became viewed as overly difficult and time consuming.53 After the
Cold War, domestic regulation applied to foreign conduct also
became a more palatable (albeit surreptitious way) for the United
States to exert global influence than traditional overt empire
building.54 At the very least, it became a way to expand the sphere of
American influence without having to worry about the constraints
that international treaties impose.55
A number of changes explain the trend towards extraterritorial
regulation. Globalization played a role,56 although its role is often
overstated.57 Changes in domestic procedural rules also encouraged
the trend.58 The doctrines of prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction
53. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris, and Contrary
Practice, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 531,
533–34 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996) (explaining how treaty negotiation was perceived as
―slow and cumbersome‖ and ascribing this as a reason for the development of customary
international law); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties‟ End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1241 (2008) (criticizing
and describing limits of traditional treaties).
54. See Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality, and U.S.
Predominance in International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 156 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (describing the
U.S. shift away from international law and towards domestic law as a tool of foreign policy).
55. See id. at 156, 162–63 (explaining how from a ―U.S. perspective, law is an important
device for the regulation of international society – as long as it is not applied to itself‖). For a
description of some of the possible reasons for U.S. unilateralism in human rights, see
Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in THE COST OF
ACTING ALONE: MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY 345 (Shepard Forman &
Stewart Patrick eds., 2001).
56. See David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets as a Challenge to
National Regulatory Systems, 29 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 287, 298 (2004) (noting how global
markets ―enhance pressure on [jurisdictional rules] by increasing the likelihood, intensity,
and potential consequences of conflicts among states and, to a growing extent, among
international and transnational institutions‖). For a broader description on the impact of
globalization, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999); THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2007).
57. For a general discussion, see Austen Parrish, Domestic Responses to Transnational
Crime: The Limits of National Law, 23 CRIM. L.F. 275, 285 (2012) (explaining how
globalization and extraterritoriality are not twinned concepts); see also RAUSTIALA, supra
note 29, at 118–19 (noting how in early periods of globalization domestic law remained
strictly territorially prescribed and that ―history presents a puzzle for accounts that link
extraterritoriality to economic interdependence‖).
58. George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 347, 347 (describing how doctrines of adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction, as
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drifted away from their territorial orientations, and courts and
academics adopted the doctrines wholesale into the international
arena without much contemplation as to whether such adoption was
appropriate.59 The legislature was also incentivized to regulate
extraterritorially as Congress grew generally indifferent to foreign
concerns.60 The general growth of domestic regulation post-New
Deal may also have made extraterritorial regulation more likely.61
Lastly, changes in legal theory created a new legal orthodoxy that
disfavored international law and promoted unilateral domestic
regulation. This last change, while it has not received as much
attention, may have had the biggest impact.
C. The Impact of Legal Theory
Innovations in intellectual thought—both from the left and right
of the political spectrums—have had a particular influence in the area
of extraterritorial regulation.62 The first came in the form of a

well as venue and choice of law, were ―swept clear of nearly all rules, at least those that
[could] be applied in more or less determinate fashion‖).
59. See, e.g., Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The
Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 341
(2008) (describing how courts are prone to use domestic doctrines, without thought, when
addressing transnational issues); Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of
Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 71 (2004) (―[I]n the United States there is a continuing
attempt to squeeze the parallel proceedings problem into the shoes of domestic doctrines,
shoes that are both too small and too old to fit the larger needs of transnational dispute
resolution.‖). For a general discussion of the incorrect reliance on domestic precedent in the
transnational context, see Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222–24 (11th Cir.
1999). See generally Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction
Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (describing how
in the personal jurisdiction context, courts failed to distinguish domestic and transnational
contexts and understand the meaningful differences).
60. See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Extraterritoriality 5 (APSA Annual
Meeting Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1
900156 (explaining how one would predict that ―Congress would push both for immunity for
domestic producers from foreign regulation and for extraterritorial application of U.S.
regulation‖).
61. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT‘L L. 1, 12–
13 (2002) (―In the New Deal and immediate postwar eras, domestic regulatory law expanded
markedly in the U.S. and across the globe.‖); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring,
Extraterritoriality in a Globalized World 2–5 (1997), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so
13/papscfm?Abstract_id=39380 (connecting the growth of extraterritoriality with the rise of
the regulatory state).
62. For a recent discussion of the trends in the Alien Tort Statute context, see Childress,
supra note 47, at 710–12 (discussing how ―two primary camps in this debate‖ have ―elicited
such pronounced, rich, cross-disciplinary, and wide-ranging perspectives‖). For a detailed
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sustained attack on multilateralism from scholars who are hostile to
international law and institutions. These scholars—sometimes
referred to as nationalists, revisionists, or Sovereigntists—are usually
associated with right-leaning groups.63 For them, international law
poses a threat to democratic sovereignty.64 International law, they
contend, amounts to no more than ―a mere set of rhetorical statements
that are obeyed only when convenient‖65 and ―international law
essentially doesn‘t matter (or doesn‘t matter very much).‖66
American exceptionalism—the idea that the United States is different
from the rest of the world and unbound by the rules it promotes—
drives this worldview.67
This is not to say that anti-internationalism is something new. A
long American legal tradition68 has promoted isolationist positions.69
But in the 1990s and 2000s, the nature of these attacks became more
pronounced and sustained. In the past, right-leaning academics had
supported international laws that promoted free trade and neo-liberal

treatment, see Parrish, supra note 14, at 822–27 (detailing the ideological differences
between the sovereigntists and the modern internationalists).
63. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False
Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9 (introducing the term ―Sovereigntists‖ and
describing their basic beliefs); see also Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2003) (describing the difference between realists and liberal
internationalists).
64. For two stark examples, see Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of
International Meddling: An Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299 (2002)
(arguing that international law and particularly international organizations are a threat to
U.S. democratic sovereignty); Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn
2003, at 22, 34 (―[I]nternational law is a threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic
politics all over the world.‖).
65. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 485, 492–93 (2005).
66. Greenberg, supra note 63, at 1791 (describing realist and liberal internationalist
scholarship).
67. See James C. Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J.
INT‘L L. 121, 121 (2000); see also Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480–87 (2003).
68. See Harlan Grant Cohen, The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative
Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 551, 552 (2003).
69. See Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 369, 389 (2005) (―US
reluctance to international treaties has strong cultural roots, goes back to the late 18th
century when the country was still weak, and finds expression in the high hurdles erected by
the US Constitution for treaty ratification.‖).
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policies.70 But in the 1990s that subsided too. Even innocuous
bilateral agreements that sought to preserve American sovereignty
and security were viewed as conspiracies to create world
governments.71 The mere mention of foreign or international law in a
judicial decision spurred radical reactions.72 In the political realm,
―an increasing number of Republicans had come to view treaties in
general (especially multilateral ones) as liberal conspiracies to hand
over American sovereignty to international authorities.‖73
The second innovation came from the political left.
Traditionally, those supportive of international law sought to use
multilateral treaties and international institutions as a way to promote
human and environmental rights and to secure global peace and
stability.74 But this changed, as internationalists began to focus on
sub-state mechanisms and non-governmental actors, and attacked
70. See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J.
INT‘L L. 381, 381 (describing how conservatives generally approve of global multilateral
trade agreements but are openly skeptical of other global multilateral agreements).
71. See Debora VanNijnatten, The Security and Prosperity Agreement as an “Indicator
Species” for the Emerging North American Environmental Regime, 35 POL. & POL‘Y 664,
666 (2007) (noting that the Security and Prosperity Agreement had ―become a lightning rod
for those opposed to a North America whose constituent nations are more economically,
politically, or culturally integrated – and there are many such opponents.‖); cf. Beth Lyon,
The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: An Overlooked
Opportunity to Change the “Brown Collar” Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. &
POL. 389, 414 (2010) (―Seven human rights treaties are pending on the Foreign Relations
Committee calendar and six of them have been pending for more than 10 years.‖); Ken I.
Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 346 (2005) (describing ―an elite-driven, politicallymotivated worldwide trend toward judicial governance, which is antithetical to democratic
self-rule, if not to the rule of law itself‖).
72. The most radical included calls for mass impeachment and death threats. See Carl
Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has „Run Amok,‟ Adding
Congress is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at A21 (describing how Senator
Coburn‘s chief of staff, Michael Schwartz, has called for ―mass impeachment‖ of federal
judges); Tony Mauro, Ginsburg Discloses Threats on Her Life: In Speeches, Justice Says
She and Sandra Day O‟Connor Were Targeted Because of Use of Foreign Law in Cases,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at 8. See generally Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The
U.S. Supreme Court‟s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (describing the debate
over the use of foreign and international law).
73. Bellinger, supra note 5. Opposition to the Rome Statute and the International
Criminal Court is also a common example of this. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The
International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Anti-treaty Discourse, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2003) (―[O]ne might say that the ICC impinges on American
sovereignty because criminal jurisdiction has long been primarily based on territoriality and
nationality.‖).
74. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT‘L
L. 94, 99 (1929) (concluding that multilateral treaties present an ―interest of stability and of
generality‖).
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traditional treaty law.75 Some of the change was driven by a tendency
of some legal academics to take descriptive theories from other
disciplines and turn them into prescriptive or normative theories. So
while anthropologists and sociologists were content to note that
international relations were disaggregating, legal scholars argued that
international law normatively should disaggregate.76 The old theories
of territoriality, which promoted multilateral agreement, were also
viewed as outdated.77 Some even argued that the growth in the
extraterritorial application of national laws, regardless of legality,
was not only desirable, but also inevitable.78
These intellectual trends had their impact. The United States
slowly withdrew and disengaged from international law and many of
its institutions.79 The enthusiasm that once existed for international
75. See Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal Law: Comment, 94 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 249,
250 (2000) (describing the central assumption of liberal theory that ―the future of effective
international regulation lies not with traditional treaties . . . but with transnational
networks‖); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC‘Y
INT‘L L. PROC. 240, 246 (2000) (criticizing traditional public international law, particularly
how it ―assumes its own pride of place in the rules contributing to international order‖ and
the resulting ―unmistakable message is that international order is created from the top
down‖).
76. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 5–6 (2004).
77. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 306, 316 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (describing how
―[a]n earlier [male] WASP establishment‖ was largely responsible for crafting international
law in the immediate post-World War II period); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The
Proliferation of Actions in the International System, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE
PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY 25 (Yves
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (describing how a new generation of scholars, which
included women and minorities, sought to distinguish themselves from the earlier architects
of international law).
78. See Stephen Coughlan et al., Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization, 6 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 29, 29 (2006)
(initially prepared as a Report to the Law Commission of Canada) (arguing that globalization
―ensure[s] that the extraterritorial application of national legal powers cannot be avoided‖).
But see RAUSTIALA, supra note 29, at 118 (describing, but disagreeing with, the commonly
held view that, as economic and social activity globalizes, the law must inevitably follow
suit and become less territorially bounded).
79. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1197 (2005)
(describing the U.S. disengagement from multilateral treaties and international legal
obligations as ―dazzlingly broad‖); see also PATRICIA JUREWICZ & KRISTIN DAWKINS, THE
TREATY DATABASE: A MONITOR OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS iii (2004),
available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/Jurewicz-P-and-Dawkins-K_EN _sep
2004_IATP_the-treaty-database-us-participation.pdf (describing the steady decline in the
U.S. government‘s support of the United Nations and the agreements it helped establish);
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law and institutions as the Cold War came to an end was soon
replaced with a general skepticism. The United States declined to
become a party to a number of key conventions,80 and attempted to
limit its obligations under existing treaties.81 At the same time, a
dramatic expansion in unilateralism occurred.82 Sovereigntists were
much less concerned about unilateral domestic laws (initially
believing them to not threaten sovereignty), and the new
internationalists overlooked the unilateral and imperial aspects of
extraterritorial laws, viewing those laws as at least some progress in
addressing global challenges. In the Alien Tort Statute context, the
cases seemed a logical extension of public law litigation that had

PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL
RULES 227–28, 233 (2005) (arguing that the Bush Administration had ―scant regard for the
international rule of law‖ and that ―the rewriting of international conventions could be
achieved unilaterally‖).
80. See Isaac Baker, Rogue State? U.S. Spurns Treaty After Treaty, GLOBAL POL‘Y F.
(Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/157/27021.html
(naming several treaties rejected by the U.S. Government).
81. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT‘L L.
458, 458–60 (1998) (describing an ―alarming exacerbation‖ of the U.S. failure to fully
respect its treaty obligations in the 1990s); Thomas M. Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously, 82
AM. J. INT‘L L. 67, 67 (1988) (explaining that ―the United States seems increasingly content
to be perceived by other nations as indifferent to its most solemn treaty obligations‖). In the
human rights context, the United States began to attach reservations to treaties it ratified.
See, e.g., JOSEPH D. BECKER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF NATIONS: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN AMERICAN COURTS 41 (2001) (describing how in the 1990s, the United States ―adopted
the practice of attaching reservations (or their equivalent) to ratified treaties‖); Margaret E.
McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International
Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 759 (2006) (―[T]he United States in the
exercise of its foreign affairs powers has become more sophisticated in its use of
reservations, understandings and declarations to limit its obligations under the central human
rights regimes . . . .‖).
82. This unilateralism appeared in a wide range of contexts. See, e.g., Harold Hongju
Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354 (2006) (―America‘s new diplomatic
strategy emphasizes strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism, characterized by a
broad antipathy toward international law and global regime-building through treaty
negotiation.‖); William H. Taft, IV, A View from the Top: American Perspectives on
International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT‘L L. 503, 504 (2006) (arguing that,
although an ―acceleration of international cooperation‖ was expected after the Cold War
ended, the ―1990s revealed a loss of enthusiasm in the United States for multilateral
approaches‖). An example of unilateralism occurred not only in how the United States
responded to terrorism, but also in areas like humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., W.
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 3, 17
(2000) (supporting unilateralism in the context of humanitarian intervention, even when the
action is contrary to the UN Charter or international law); Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the
Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1317 (2010)
(explaining how unauthorized humanitarian intervention is a practice where states
unilaterally exempt themselves from the constraints of international law).
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been embraced as part of the U.S. civil rights movement.83 As
activists turned to courts, the U.S. legal system began to export its
particular brand of justice. And then—more recently and less noticed
in the United States—other countries began to follow suit.84
II. DOMESTIC DEBATES TAKE THEIR TOLL
The above has briefly described a rise of extraterritorial domestic
laws, often as a substitute for more traditional international
lawmaking. In the last few years, however, transnationalism in the
United States has come under attack. Ironically, these attacks have
had little to do with international law or theory.
A.

Transnational Litigation in the Supreme Court

Kiobel is by no means unique. In a number of other contexts,
U.S. courts have begun to display a nervousness about being a
battleground for foreign disputes. Kiobel may have called into doubt
the applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations, but
recently courts have also decided that corporations cannot be sued
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act,85 that the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act does not apply to

83. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2366 (1991); Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combating Terrorism
Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEXAS INT‘L L.J. 169 (1987). Professor
Koh‘s work builds, in part, on the public law litigation work by Abram Chayes in the 1970s.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
84. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts:
A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127 (2013) (describing human rights
litigation outside the United States); Jodie A. Kirshner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the
Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe? Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the
Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 259 (2012) (describing how European states are
becoming more open to exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction); INT‘L BAR ASS‘N, supra
note 13, at 142 (surveying twenty-seven states and finding that ―[s]ome states have recently
shown an increased tendency to broaden the ambit of their criminal law‖ extraterritorially);
Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic
Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057 (2004) (describing the spread of universal jurisdiction criminal
prosecutions); see also Beth Stephens, Expanding Remedies for Human Rights Abuses: Civil
Litigation in Domestic Courts, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 119,
138 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000) (encouraging the spread of
transnational human rights litigation beyond the United States).
85. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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extraterritorial corporate activities,86 and that the principal antifraud
provision of the federal securities laws does not apply
extraterritorially to foreign transactions.87 In a host of contexts, U.S.
courts have refused to be the primary venue for global litigation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has led the retreat. The clearest recent
example was the unanimous decision in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.88 Morrison was a product of the U.S. housing
bubble and mortgage crisis. The case involved three Australian
investors who had bought stock in Australia‘s largest bank.89 The
investors claimed that the bank‘s Florida-based subsidiaries had
miscalculated interest rates on mortgages it was servicing, causing
the value of the parent bank‘s stock to plummet.90 Seeking a class
action remedy, the investors brought suit in the United States,
claiming that the subsidiary had made false and misleading
statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.91 The
critical issue focused on extraterritoriality: whether the anti-fraud
provisions of the American securities laws applied when foreign
plaintiffs sued ―foreign and American defendants for misconduct in
connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.‖92
The Court concluded that the American Securities laws did not
apply. The decision put an end to so-called ―foreign-cubed‖ cases, or
cases brought by foreign claimants against a foreign company in
relation to shares bought on a foreign exchange.93 The decision was
striking in that both the Court‘s liberal and conservative members
were in general agreement. While they disagreed over the doctrinal
tests to be used—reflecting the same division in Kiobel—the Justices
uniformly found some meaningful connection with the United States
necessary. The message was clear: U.S. courts are not the world‘s
courts.

86. See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir.
2010).
87. Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2875–76.
90. Id. at 2876.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2875.
93. Jonathan R. Tuttle et al., Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Reflecting on its
Impact One Year Later, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2011 701, 703
(Practising Law Inst. ed., 2011).
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A second line of cases arose in the adjudicatory jurisdiction area,
with J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro94 and Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown95—the Court‘s first foray into
personal jurisdiction in almost twenty years. In McIntyre, a plaintiff
had suffered serious injuries while operating a shearing machine in
New Jersey, at the company where he worked.96 The plaintiff filed a
lawsuit in New Jersey state court against the British manufacturer of
the shearing machine.97 The question was whether the New Jersey
court had personal jurisdiction over the British corporation. In
Goodyear, the parents of two boys, who were killed in a bus accident
in France, brought a lawsuit in North Carolina.98 The lawsuit alleged
that the accident resulted from a defective tire manufactured in
Turkey at the plant of a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear.99 The lawsuit
named Goodyear as a defendant as well as three of its subsidiaries
organized and separately incorporated in Turkey, France, and
Luxembourg. The foreign corporate defendants moved to dismiss on
the ground that the North Carolina court had no personal jurisdiction
over them.100
In both cases, the Court strongly reaffirmed that territorial
sovereignty is critical to a court‘s personal jurisdiction analysis—that
borders matter.101 The Court in Goodyear explained that defendants
are not subject to general jurisdiction unless they are ―essentially at
home‖ in the forum.102

94. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). For a description of the case, see Adam Steinman, The Lay of
the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV.
481 (2011).
95. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
96. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
97. Id.
98. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For an analysis, see Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of
Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617, 617–18 (2012) (explaining how in
both cases the Court found boundaries important as a matter of principle and that state
sovereignty is central to the personal jurisdiction analysis); see also Adam N. Steinman, The
Meaning of McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT‘L LAW 417 (2012).
102. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Allan Stein,
The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527 (2012).
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Domestic Debates and U.S. Culture Wars

Ironically, the attack on domestic courts unilaterally resolving
international challenges through extraterritorial laws have benefited
little from the serious debate about the role of courts in global
governance, but instead mostly reflect recurring domestic debates
largely untethered from international concerns.103
Much of the criticism of transnational litigation mirrors debates
raised in the tort reform movement.104 For a number of scholars,
transnational litigation is just another battle between the plaintiff and
defense bars. For them, the Alien Tort Statute encourages the filing
of ―frivolous lawsuits that only serve to fill the coffers of
contingency-fee law firms.‖105 Echoing the long-standing debate of
whether too much litigation exists in the United States,106 much of the
attack is based on the idea of litigation out-of-control.107 From this
perspective, Alien Tort litigation only serves the interests of
―avaricious class-action lawyers‖ and the ―latter day pirates of the
plaintiffs‘ bar‖ seeking ―gargantuan remedies for domestic torts.‖108
When the focus is not on a so-called litigation crisis, the debate
pivots to one over the role of courts, and whether the courts are
somehow usurping the prerogatives of other branches when it
103. It‘s unsurprising that debates about the Alien Tort Statute often reflect domestic
political squabbles. See Jide Nzelibe, Desperately Seeking Political Cover: The Partisan
Logic of Alien Tort Statute Litigation 3 (Northwestern Searle Ctr. on Law, Regulation, and
Econ. Growth, Working Paper No. 009, 2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/searlecenter/papers/Nzelibe_Alien_Tort_Statute.pdf (discussing the debates between
Democrats and Republicans regarding international policy).
104. See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform”
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 470–80 (2006) (describing the tort reform movement).
105. Daniel Swearingen, Alien Tort Reform: A Proposal to Revise the Alien Tort Statute,
48 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 110 (2011). For a well-cited example, see Joseph G. Finnerty III &
John Merrigan, Op-Ed, Legal Imperialism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2007, at A15 (―While
asbestos and tobacco litigation bonanzas are winding down, America's most aggressive
contingency-fee law firms still have in place a fee structure in search of an investment
strategy. And so, faced with shrinking domestic opportunities, these firms have gone
global.‖).
106. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447 (2004).
107. See Finnerty & Merrigan, supra note 105, at A15 (―[I]t ultimately will be impractical
for U.S. courts to police these monster ATS class actions if they are allowed to proliferate;
they dwarf in size the asbestos cases that currently plague the U.S. courts.‖).
108. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational
Enterprise: Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 3, 8
(2003) (quoting John E. Howard, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok
Going Global?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.uschamber.com/pr
ess/opeds/0210howarditigation.htm).
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addresses foreign matters.109 The Morrison case and the debates over
prescriptive jurisdiction provide a good example. One is struck how
the Justices are much less concerned about the effect of a particular
rule, and much more concerned with legislative primacy and the
spectre of judicial creativity or policy-making.110 And if separation of
powers is not the concern, then the attack on extraterritoriality often
focuses on defending a particular kind of federalism, rather than
offering any sort of plausible conception of international law.111
This focus on the domestic is not surprising. American scholars
regularly rely on domestic theory, without any serious consideration
as to whether the domestic can be so easily grafted onto the
international, or whether the two situations are comparable at all.112
III. REBUILDING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Most of the discussion surrounding Kiobel, both before and after
the decision, has focused on doctrinal issues. Did the Court correctly
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality? Does the
presumption against extraterritoriality apply in cases involving
common law tort litigation? Does international law permit domestic
109. See, e.g., Recent Cases, Ninth Circuit Uses International Law to Decide Applicable
Substantive Law Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2003)
(describing the risk that the Alien Tort Statute becomes ―a generator of interminable
litigation‖ and invitation for ―judicial creativity‖ to interpret international law without
constraint) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a general discussion, see Oona A.
Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1413–14 (2006) (describing how scholars like Curtis Bradley, Eric
Posner, and Jack Goldsmith critique international law from a particular domestic perspective
concerned about federalism).
110. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of
American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 666–67 (2011) (describing legislative supremacy as ―the
decision‘s chief ideological component,‖ but explaining how the Morrison decision
ultimately permits judicial creativity). For a general discussion of the concern over judicial
policymaking in the constitutional context, see Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of
Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519 (2012).
111. See Childress, supra note 47, at 709 (describing how federalism has factored into
debates over Alien Tort Statute litigation); see also Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State
Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295–96
(1994).
112. Cf. Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence
of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 341 (2008)
(describing how courts are prone to use domestic doctrines when addressing transnational
issues).
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courts to adjudicate foreign-cubed cases? But regardless of the
doctrinal answers—and whether such cases are legally permitted—
extraterritorial and unilateral approaches to global governance have
significant costs. It‘s not clear that these kinds of laws are helpful in
advancing and protecting human rights.
A.

The Costs of Extraterritorial Regulation

Unilateral extraterritorial regulation of foreigners is problematic
for several reasons. Legitimacy is a primary concern. Extraterritorial
laws are in tension with democratic principles because they impose
obligations on individuals who have had no formal voice in the
political process.113 Even when the underlying norm is universally
agreed upon, rarely do foreigners view those norms as being
appropriately adjudicated world wide—the ―mere enforcement‖ of
international law does not exist. Indeed, American-style litigation has
its unique procedural aspects.114 Seldom do foreigners view
themselves as getting a fair shake in our courts,115 just as Americans

113. See Parrish, supra note 14, at 859–60 (describing how extraterritorial laws are
undemocratic because they regulate foreigners who have no say in the enactment of those
laws); see also Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The
Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the
Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 312–
13 (describing the unfairness and undemocratic nature of extraterritorial laws).
114. See Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 320 (2002)
(noting that the complaints foreigners make about U.S. civil litigation include complaints
about ―juries, discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and often substantive American law,
which is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected under similar pro-plaintiff choice of law
rules‖); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV.
553, 560–64 (1989) (discussing forum shopping and the perceived advantages it creates for
plaintiffs in U.S. litigation); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum
Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a
Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 501, 502 (1993) (explaining how U.S. courts offer
procedural advantages for foreign plaintiffs ―beyond those of foreign forums,‖ including ―the
existence of civil juries, the availability of broad discovery, easier access to courts and
lawyers, contingent fee arrangements, and the absence of ‗loser-pay-all‘ cost-shifting rules‖).
115. See, e.g., Elmer J. Stone & Kenneth H. Slade, Special Considerations in
International Licensing Agreements, 1 TRANS. L. 161, 169 (1988) (explaining how both U.S.
and foreign parties fear discrimination in each other‘s respective court systems); Kevin R.
Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundation and Modern Justifications for
Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 22–25
(1996) (describing the fear and perception of bias against foreign citizens); cf. Chandra
Lekha Sririam, Human Rights Claims v. the State: Is Sovereignty Really Eroding?, 1
INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. 107, 117 (2006) (―To the degree the proceedings take place in the
courts of powerful Western states, and often in those of former colonizers, the argument that
cases are selective, and even driven by imperialistic agendas, can be and has been raised.‖).
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often view foreign systems skeptically.116 This perception of bias
may be misplaced and empirically wrong,117 but it is widespread.118
The legitimacy point is pronounced in the human rights context
where the United States appears to promote a double standard by
frustrating efforts to hold its own citizens and officials liable for
foreign human rights abuses.119 The lack of perceived legitimacy
116. See ERIC POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 228 (2009) (noting that
―American legalism does not extend very far from its shores‖ and that Americans do not
support decisions unless made by ―American courts, which are staffed by Americans who
share American values and interests‖).
117. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1121–22, 1143 (1996) (exploring reasons why foreigners fear U.S.
courts but concluding that empirically foreigners do not fare badly in U.S. litigation); Kevin
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before and
After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 442 (2007) (noting that ―commentary down to
the present day deploys the assumption that foreign litigants arrive here at a disadvantage,‖
even though empirical evidence suggests otherwise); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of
Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 732–34 (2009)
(describing the perception of bias against foreigners and in favor of plaintiffs in choice-oflaw decisions, but finding it empirically untrue).
118. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 2 All E.R. 72 (A.C.) 74
(Lord Denning M.R.) (―As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.‖); Utpal
Bhattacharya et al., The Home Court Advantage in International Corporate Litigation, 50
J.L. & ECON. 625, 629 (2007) (―Our article supports the conclusion . . . [that] foreign firms
are disadvantaged in U.S. courts.‖); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1503 (2003) (―Whether the xenophobic bias exists in fact, there can
be no controversy about the reality of the perception that bias exists in American courts and
American juries.‖); John S. Willems, Shutting the U.S. Courthouse Door?: Forum Non
Conveniens in International Arbitration, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 54, 56 (2003) (―Litigants are
attracted to the high quality of U.S. courts, the willingness of U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction over international disputes, and, rightly or wrongly, the belief that U.S. courts
are ready to award large sums of damages.‖); see also Parrish, supra note 59, at 44–47
(citing sources and describing the perception of bias in U.S. courts). The perception that U.S.
courts are plaintiff friendly is long-standing.
119. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that U.S. officials
are immunized for claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute for actions within their scope
of employment); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (holding that while
there may exist ―an international law obligation on the part of the United States . . . not all
international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in
United States courts‖); Karen Lin, An Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect
of the Westfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1718 (2008)
(describing the double-standard created where U.S. officials are immunized for human rights
violations). For a discussion on American exceptionalism in the human rights field, see
Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International
Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 94 (2007) (noting ―the
longstanding refusal of the United States to incorporate international human rights law into
its legal system‖); Hathaway, supra note 67, at 132 (noting how the ―United States
simultaneously asserts the right to lead, but also to be exempted from the rules it promotes‖).
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calls into serious question the long-term sustainability of enforcing
human rights norms unilaterally.
Aside from the legitimacy concern, whether extraterritorial laws
actually work is unclear. Scant evidence exists to support claims that
unilateral extraterritorial laws deter future human rights abuses or
provide remedies for past violations.120 In the criminal and human
rights context, despite the explosion of extraterritorial laws,
―prosecutions have been few.‖121 Human rights civil claims are often
unenforceable and remain symbolic at best.122
Unilateral regulation, applied extraterritorially, also runs the risk
of being counter-productive.123 As an initial matter, because universal
jurisdiction is controversial, its use risks turning the focus away from
the victims and the perpetrators of human rights abuses, and instead
redirects global attention to the methods of enforcement.124 The
contentiousness also risks eroding international cooperation in other
areas125 and creating an unnecessary level of confusion. The result of
120. See Michael D. Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, THE AM.
LAW., Oct. 12, 2010 (describing how most Alien Tort Statute cases have resulted in
favorable rulings to corporate defendants).
121. See DOYLE, supra note 49, at 1 (noting how successful prosecutions are rare and the
―practical and legal complications‖ of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction); Catherine
Beaulieu, Extraterritorial Laws: Why They Are Not Really Working and How They Can Be
Strengthened, ECPAT INT‘L COMPENDIUM OF ARTICLES, Sept. 2008, at 8–9, 16 (noting the
―very low number of prosecutions and convictions achieved under extraterritorial laws,‖ at
least in relation to offences against children); Benjamin Perrin, Taking a Vacation from the
Law? Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and Section 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code, 13
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 176 (2009) (―In the decade following the adoption of Canada‘s
extraterritorial child sex crime provisions . . . only a single conviction was entered.‖).
122. See Julian Ku, The Alien Tort Statute as a Species of Extraterritorial U.S. Law,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 16, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-kiobel-symposi
um-the-alien-tort-statute-as-a-species-of-extraterritorial-u-s-law/ (―[A]s very few ATS cases
amounted to enforceable judgments or significant settlements, the ATS seemed a largely
symbolic tool. The ATS fascinated academics, especially international law professors, but it
seemed to have little practical significance.‖); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco,
Plaintiff‟s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102, 106 (stating that the principal
benefit in human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act may be ―the public
attention they generate‖); cf. Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise
and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 369, 398 (noting that private environmental citizen suits ―were
often more symbolic than substantive‖).
123. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The
Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT‘L L. 211, 303 (2005) (―[T]o date the human rights
community has offered little outward reflection on whether an aggressive agenda focused on
domestic courts may harm the very institutions to which these advocates have turned.‖).
124. For a more developed analysis, see Parrish, supra note 57 .
125. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 96 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
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aggressive foreign regulation is increased uncertainty, overlapping
concurrent jurisdiction, and an increased likelihood of parallel
proceedings. This piecemeal approach to a shared challenge increases
the fragmentation of international law that has become a standing
concern. Most importantly, extraterritorial domestic laws give the
illusion that serious steps are being taken, when in actuality little
progress has been made.
Lastly, there is the reciprocity concern. We should be concerned
with how other countries will define and develop human rights
laws.126 Creating an international free-for-all where any nation has
the authority to unilaterally prosecute international human rights
abuses requires that we be comfortable with other countries
prosecuting Americans for activity taking place within our borders,127
even when that activity might be considered legal and not a human
rights abuse by U.S. standards.128 The United States has promoted a
particular vision of human rights. As law migration occurs,129 it‘s
3d ed. 2008) (―Vigorous assertions of jurisdiction [in the criminal law context] ultimately
erode cooperation.‖). For an example, see Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa,
Statement of the National Houses of Parliament and the Nation at the Tabling of the Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Apr. 5, 2003) (―[W]e consider it completely
unacceptable that matters that are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated
in foreign courts which bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country.‖).
126. A number of commentators have noted the increase of human rights litigation in
other parts of the world. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 (2010) (describing how the threat of
liability that defendants face in foreign courts has increased); see also Eugene Gulland, All
the World's a Forum, NAT‘L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at B13 (―Recent foreign court
decisions . . . . suggest a more aggressive tendency to prefer non-U.S. forums and apply nonU.S. law to disputes involving U.S. companies.‖).
127. For concerns of this kind of reciprocity, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of
International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 457, 461 (2001) (explaining how
―other nations may retaliate by allowing suits against U.S. government actors‖).
128. See Alfred P. Rubin, Can the United States Police the World, 13 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 371, 374 (1989) (explaining how imposing U.S. law ―creates a defensive
reaction in even our allies . . . It creates a precedent and a sense of righteousness in others
who would apply their laws and their versions of international law to Americans whose
actions they do not like‖); see also POSNER, supra note 116, at 228 (arguing that ―before
long‖ China, Russia, India, and Brazil ―will be able to advance their views about
international law – views that no doubt will serve their interests‖ and noting that ―Russia has
quickly learned that pliable human rights language and the precedents of Kosovo and Iraq
can be turned to its advantage‖).
129. Y. Dezalay & B. Garth, Dollarizing State and Professional Expertise: Transnational
Processes and Questions of Legitimation in State Transformation, 1960-2000, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 199 (Michael
Likosky ed., 2002) (describing how ideas and norms are imported and exported); Judith
Resnik, Law‟s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism‟s
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unclear whether other courts in other nations will develop human
rights in the same way, or whether those conceptions will be more
illiberal and non-western, or at least different.130 The spread of U.S.style litigation may make this possibility even more pronounced.131
B.

The Benefits of Multilateralism

To meaningfully advance human rights, re-embracing
multilateral132 solutions would be wise. Multilateral approaches are
longer-lasting. They also avoid fragmentation and piece-meal
approaches to solving a common problem and are more consistent
with other international law principles and mechanisms.133
First, treaties are usually more durable than unilateral forms of
governance. Because multilateral agreements are a product of consent
and negotiation,134 they are less likely to be viewed as
imperialistically imposed and more easily enforced.135 Because of
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1574 (2006) (describing how legal norms can
migrate across borders).
130. See Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty – U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of
International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 655 (2002) (―The problem lies in the
unwillingness of foreign states, including their judiciary, to go along with our project and
their ability to sabotage it.‖). For a description of the competition, conflicts, and contestation
that take place between international actors who have different normative and regulatory
agendas, see LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE (Yves Dezalay
& Bryant Garth eds., 2011).
131. See Behrens et al., supra note 50, at 166 (noting the spread of U.S.-style litigation,
litigation funding, and punitive damages); R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The
Globalization of American Law, 58 INT‘L ORG. 103, 103 (2004) (describing the spread of
U.S.-styled litigation in other nations).
132. For definitions of multilateralism, see Robert O. Keohane, Multilateralism: An
Agenda for Research, 45 INT‘L ORG. 731 (1990) (describing the coordination of national
policies among three or more states); James Caporaso, International Relations Theory and
Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations, 46 INT‘L ORG. 599, 600–02 (1992) (describing
multilateralism and the concept of ―diffuse reciprocity‖ whereby nations benefit over a
longer period of time).
133. For a discussion of the benefits of multilateralism, see John W. Head, What Has Not
Changed Since September 11 – The Benefits of Multilateralism, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y
1, 9 (2002) (―Multilateralism has been a key feature of U.S. policy for more than fifty years.
Despite some temporary departures, the United States has taken a leadership role in creating
an extensive network of global treaty rules and international institutions, on grounds that
multilateral action promises greater rewards than does a policy of going it alone.‖).
134. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 2(b), 11, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that treaties only create obligations and rights through consent);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 1, ch. 1,
intro. note (1987) (―Modern international law is rooted in acceptance by states which
constitute the system.‖).
135. See Hathaway, supra note 67, at 129 (criticizing unilateralism and noting that the
costs of multilateralism are ―more than compensated for by gains in both political legitimacy
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this characteristic, multilateral agreements make ―fundamental
transformations legitimate and peaceful.‖136 They also contain a
degree of legitimacy that unilateral approaches lack because
multilateral agreements are more egalitarian and democracy reenforcing. Others agree. An increasing body of literature suggests
that without multilateral cooperation and the creation of multilateral
institutions, progress in human rights and other related areas will fail;
that the global challenges are too great without attempts to achieve
wide-spread cooperation and consensus.137
Second, developing international treaty law and international
institutions is to harmonize standards by definition, thereby avoiding
the risks of piece-meal and hodge-podge approaches. This
fragmentation point is particularly important in the human rights
context because human rights are often not easy to define, and they
represent contested ideals.138 Human rights become ―universal‖ not
through some sort of predetermined inevitability, but only through
careful building of coalitions with different groups allied in
purpose.139 Re-embracing multilateralism also provides an
opportunity for those supportive of human right goals to ―lock-in‖ a
particular vision of global governance. Multilateral institutions are
more likely to preserve, for some time, an order that reflects existing
preferences.140 As the number of voices on the international stage
and meaningful enforceability that accrue from an understanding of international law as a
system of consent-based rules and operations‖).
136. Amitav Acharya, Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World
Politics, in MULTILATERALISM UNDER CHALLENGE? POWER, INTERNATIONAL ORDER, AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 113 (Edward Newman et al. eds., 2006).
137. See, e.g., BARBARA ADAMS & GRETCHEN LUCHSINGER, RECLAIMING
MULTILATERALISM: FOR PEOPLE, RIGHTS, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2012).
138. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 201, 203 (1998) (―What makes certain rights universal, moral, and important, and
who decides?‖); see also DEBRA L. DELAET, THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES IN WORLD POLITICS 14 (2006) (―Ultimately, human rights are not
something concrete that we can simply define, identify, and implement . . . .‖).
139. See LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 130
(describing successful and not so successful strategies to build institutions and credibility for
the transnational legal field).
140. See Krisch, supra note 69, at 373 (noting how multilateral regimes are ―less
vulnerable to later shifts in power‖ and are ―relatively stable‖); Pierre Klein, The Effects of
U.S. Predominance on the Elaboration of Treaty Regimes and on the Evolution of the Law of
Treaties, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 363,
363–65 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (explaining how ―[t]he influence exerted
by a particularly powerful State on the treaty-making process may therefore have an
important impact on the shaping of international law‖).
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increases, international human rights groups should be particularly
concerned that human rights concerns will be drowned out by the
concerns of other competing groups.141
Third, multilateral approaches are more consistent with common
understandings of international law and institutions.142 The
international system was structured to encourage cooperation, reduce
conflict, and promote democratic self-government. Unilateral
extraterritorial regulation is in tension with these basic goals. Also, to
the extent that unilateralism imposes national, rather than universal,
approaches, it is in inherent tension with the broader goals of human
rights, which depend on universalism.
The Court‘s more liberal members appear to agree. The opinion
of Chief Justice Roberts in Kiobel, joined by the Court‘s more
conservative members, was unsurprising. It tracked the Morrison
decision to find that Congress would not be assumed to have used a
contentious form of jurisdiction (i.e., an extraterritorial one) without
clear indication of its intent.143 In many ways, this is consistent with
how other jurisdictional statutes have previously been interpreted.
Rarely has the Court found that Congress intended to use all the
power granted to it under international law or the U.S.
Constitution.144 Regardless of whether commentators agree with how
141. See DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL AND BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 59 (new ed. 2006) (―[W]ith neither a membership capable of
influencing elections, nor the financial capacity to make donations or influence election
campaigns, human rights NGOs lack the powers of traditional interest groups in the domestic
political sphere.‖); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Human Rights, Cultural Relativism and
Legal Pluralism: Towards a Two-Dimensional Debate, in THE POWER OF LAW IN A
TRANSNATIONAL WORLD: ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENQUIRIES 115, 116 (Franz von BendaBeckmann et al. eds. 2009) (―[A]nthropologists and nongovernmental organizations have
also shown and defended the relativity and variability of social organizations and their
cultural values, which often were not in comformity with the ideal notions expressed in
many human rights‖); cf. Bryant G. Garth, Rebuilding International Law After the September
11th Attack: Contrasting Agendas of High Priests and Legal Realists, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L
L. REV. 3, 3 (2006) (―[T]here is competition to be a relevant voice in international
relations . . . .‖)
142. José E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and Its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 393, 394
(2000) (―Multilateralism is our shared secular religion. Despite all of our disappointments
with its functioning, we still worship at the shrine of global institutions like the UN.‖).
143. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (―We therefore
conclude the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. . . . If Congress were to determine [it wishes
to reach foreign corporate activities], a statute more specific than the ATS would be
required.‖).
144. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908)
(interpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction to be narrower than what is
constitutionally permitted); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806)
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the presumption against extraterritoriality was applied in Kiobel, the
Roberts decision was expected.
The Breyer concurrence—joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan—however, has much greater implications for
international law. Breyer would not have imposed any presumption
against extraterritorial regulation and instead would have ―looked to
established international jurisdictional norms to help determine the
statute‘s substantive reach.‖145 In finding then that the Alien Tort
Statute would not apply to foreign-cubed cases, the Breyer
concurrence underscored that the broadest forms of universal civil
jurisdiction are not permitted under international jurisdictional law.
Instead, American courts may exercise ―jurisdiction only where
distinct American interests are at issue.‖146 While Breyer recognizes
that international norms have long imposed a duty for nations ―not to
provide safe harbors for their own nationals who commit such serious
crimes abroad,‖147 the concurrence rejects the idea that human rights
claims because of their universal nature can be raised in any court. As
the concurrence explains, the facts of Kiobel do not support providing
such broad extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law.148 In
this way, Breyer respects traditional concepts of international law that
would find broad assertions of extraterritorial power problematic.149
One final point: scholars often assert, without explanation, that
in a globalized world, extraterritorial domestic regulation is
necessary.150 But why this is so is unclear. We have seen periods
(interpreting the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to be narrower than constitutional
limits).
145. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 1674.
147. Id. at 1675.
148. Id. at 1677 (―Applying these jurisdictional principles to this case, however, I agree
with the Court that jurisdiction does not lie.‖).
149. For an earlier argument that Alien Tort Statute suits against foreigners for foreign
conduct violate international jurisdictional law, see Michael D. Ramsey, International Law
Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 271, 284–86
(2009).
150. See Kirshner, supra note 84, at 262, 266 (describing how as corporations become
increasingly transnational that ―extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary‖); Slaughter &
Zaring, supra note 61, at 2–4 (arguing that a ―third shift [in extraterritoriality] is imminent,
as a necessary response to the forces of globalization‖ and that with globalization the ―tidy
circles demarcating national jurisdiction, even based on an expanded conception of
territoriality, became either impossible or meaningless‖). But see RAUSTIALA, supra note 29,
at 118 (describing, but disagreeing with, the commonly held view that as economic and
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where the world‘s economy was highly integrated, and yet domestic
law remained strictly territorially prescribed.151 And conversely, we
have seen nations use extraterritorial laws aggressively, even during
times of isolation.152 No clear reason exists why global regulation
cannot be achieved through multilateral means. At the very least,
there should be some burden to demonstrate that multilateral
agreement is unavailable before jumping to unilateral enforcement.
CONCLUSION
In the near term, human rights advocates may view the Kiobel
decision as an unraveling of progress made. But that initial
pessimism should quickly give way. While the broadest promise of
Filártiga that the Alien Tort Statute should be treated as a kind of
global cause of action is now gone, the most important parts of Alien
Tort Statute litigation remain. Claims against U.S. citizens, including
corporations, or foreign citizens living in the United States should
still be viable. More importantly, while the human rights community
may initially moan the loss, in the longer term the rejection of
unilateral regulation of foreigners for conduct abroad is a positive
development for international law. As described above, the growth of
global, unilateral regulation of the kind pluralists embrace is no
friend to human rights.
Let me end on a different note. A recent surge of commentary
invites the human rights community into a similar, or perhaps greater,
folly—to double-down and promote foreign-cubed cases under state
law and in state courts.153 With luck, this invitation will be declined.

social activity globalizes that law must inevitably follow suit and become less territorially
bounded).
151. For an overview, see Parrish, supra note 57, at 285. See also RAUSTIALA, supra note
29, at 118–19 (―As economic historians often point out, in the years preceding the First
World War the international system was in fact highly globalized . . . [which] presents a
puzzle for accounts that link extraterritoriality to economic interdependence.‖).
152. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 29, at 119; see also Margolies, supra note 34, at 576
(noting how the United States used extraterritorial laws as a particularly important tool of
foreign policy even in the nineteenth century).
153. See Christopher A. Whytock et al., Foreword: After Kiobel – International Human
Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 8 (2013)
(―We may be on the verge of a new world of transnational human rights litigation where
U.S. state courts and courts outside the United States will increasingly overshadow U.S.
federal courts as forums for the adjudication of human rights claims.‖); see also Paul
Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases under State Law and in State
Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 10 (2013) (predicting that, regardless of the Kiobel
decision, human rights cases will continue in both federal and state courts). This strategy has
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While individual litigants may have few choices, employing a state
law strategy is unlikely to meaningfully advance human rights. These
cases face tremendous hurdles to success.154 While the presumption
against extraterritoriality may not apply, courts will rightly be
reluctant to adjudicate foreign claims for abuses occurring abroad to
which the state has no interest. The same root concerns that
motivated the Kiobel court to decide the way it did, will cause state
court judges to decline to hear these cases too. The cost of lost time
and energy to this kind of strategy could be significant.
The human rights community has a different option: to reembrace multilateral engagement. Global human rights challenges are
too daunting and complex for any nation, no matter how powerful, to
effectively manage on its own. Progress can be made if human rights
groups refocus energies to press the United States, its citizens, and
corporations to respect human rights and the rule of law, and to
promote international agreements with other nations. That respect
includes avoiding unilateral imposition of U.S. law (even those laws
purporting to incorporate international norms) on foreigners for
conduct occurring abroad.

been tried before. See Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights in
State Courts: A View from California, 18 INT‘L L. 61 (1984).
154. See generally Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigation:
A Concerning Trend?, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 25, 40–41 (2013) (discussing potential
drawbacks of human rights litigation in state courts and under state law).

